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In this paper, we argue that advocates for new U.S. agricultural trade policies 
should consider refocusing their campaigns on the corporate livestock sector rather than 
farmers.  There is little evidence that farmers as a group are reaping significant gains 
from current U.S. agricultural subsidy programs, even though they are the direct 
recipients.  Low prices and high costs have left farmers with stagnant or declining net 
farm incomes.  Furthermore, there is little conclusive evidence that the removal of U.S. 
subsidy payments would significantly reduce production or raise prices, though there is 
significant disagreement on this point.  There is wider agreement that U.S. farm policies 
contribute significantly to depressed prices for agricultural commodities.  Among the 
beneficiaries of those low prices are the consumers of U.S. grains and oilseeds, notably 
the concentrated animal feeding operations that now dominate the U.S. livestock 
industry.  These industrial operations get feed that is generally sold at below farmers’ 
costs of production.   
 
We raise two questions for future research, and provide tentative answers.  First, 
would U.S. policies that ensure higher feed prices reduce the incentives toward 
concentrated feeding operations and tip the economic balance back toward diversified 
family farmers?  Initial research suggests that the economic benefits of current policies to 
corporate livestock operators are significant and that their reform could contribute to 
structural change in the farm sector in favor of family farmers.  Second, since subsidies to 
feed are not now treated as highly disciplined input subsidies for livestock operations 
under World Trade Organization rules, would a more accurate accounting bring U.S. 
subsidies above the maximum levels allowed in the prevailing Agreement on 
Agriculture?  We present initial calculations that suggest such an accounting change 





In this paper, we argue that advocates for new U.S. agricultural trade policies 
should consider refocusing their attention on the corporate livestock sector rather than 
farmers.  The doubling of farm program costs since the 1996 Farm Bill has generated 
calls for the elimination of farm subsidies.  Farmers are presented as relatively wealthy 
business people getting taxpayer money that encourages overproduction (see, for 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Muriel Calo and Elanor Starmer for invaluable assistance with this 
research. He also appreciated helpful comments on earlier drafts from George Naylor, Steve Suppan, Molly 
Anderson, Jacques Berthelot, and Dennis Olson.  Note that this working paper was updated in June 2006 
with new calculations on pages 8-9 of the estimated increases in U.S. AMS notifications if feed subsidies 





example, Environmental Working Group 2004; Gardner 2005).  Still, there is little 
evidence that farmers as a group are reaping significant gains from current U.S. 
agricultural subsidy payments, even though they are the direct recipients (Wise 2005).  
As Figure 1 shows, low prices and high costs have left farmers with stagnant or declining 












































There is little conclusive evidence that the removal of U.S. subsidy payments 
would significantly reduce production or raise prices, though there is significant 
disagreement on this point.  While the prevailing view is that eliminating U.S. farm 
subsidies would reduce overproduction and raise prices (see, for example, Sumner 2005), 
comprehensive economic modeling suggests that this would be true only to a very limited 
extent for most crops, cotton and rice being the most notable exceptions (Ray, de la Torre 
Ugarte et al. 2003; Wise 2004).  Still, even though there is little agreement about whether 
farm subsidies are the cause or effect of low farm prices, there is wide agreement that 
U.S. farm policy – be it farm subsidies or the absence of effective supply management 
policies – contributes significantly to lowering prices for agricultural commodities.   
 
 
Industrial Livestock: Indirect Beneficiaries 
 
Among the beneficiaries of low farm prices are the consumers of U.S. grains and 
oilseeds, the industries that depend on agriculture for their raw materials.  Among the 
most significant consumers of U.S. farm products are the concentrated animal feeding 





the most heavily subsidized crops in U.S. commodity programs. Around 55-65% of corn 
and 45-50% of soybeans, the two principal sources for U.S. feed, go to the domestic 
livestock industry.
2  Other feed grains include oats, barley, sorghum, and some types of 
wheat.  Feed costs account for 60-64% of poultry and egg costs, some 17% of beef cattle 
costs,
3 and about 47% of hog production costs.
4  Livestock and meat now account for 
roughly the same value in U.S. agricultural production as all crop production combined, 
and the share continues to rise.  Meat is also an increasingly important export.  In 2001, 
the United States exported 9% of its beef, 8% of its pork, 18% of its broiler chicken meat, 
and 9% of its turkey meat.
5    
 
Unlike most crop farming, most livestock operations are highly concentrated, 
vertically integrated corporate enterprises owned by some of the largest agribusiness 
companies in the world.  In contrast to the farming sector, which, though highly 
concentrated in terms of landholding and production, remains largely in the hands of 
family-based operators, the largest livestock producers are U.S. agribusinesses, such as 
Cargill, ConAgra, Tyson, and Smithfield.  They overwhelmingly operate concentrated 
animal feeding operations, or CAFOs, better known as factory farms.   
 
Factory farms have been widely criticized for their environmental impacts, low 
wages, and dangerous workplaces, in addition to animal welfare concerns.  Their 
emergence is largely blamed for the demise of the diversified family farm, which used to 
produce not just commodities like corn, soybeans, and other bulk crops but also farm-
raised livestock. 
 
Table 1.  
Selected Agri-food CR4 Concentration Ratios, 2004 
 
Beef Packers         84% 
Pork Packers         64% 
Pork Production        49% 
Broiler Production        56% 
Turkey Production        51% 
Animal Feed Processing      34% 
Flour  Milling       63% 
Soybean Crushing        71% (top three firms) 
 
Source: Hendrickson and Heffernan (2005) 
 
                                                 
2 Corn and soybeans account for 83-91% of the ingredients in most feed grains. USDA, Feed Grains Data 
Delivery System, http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/feedgrains/default.asp?ERSTab=0 
3 In US, feed costs as % of total costs are: 17% for cattle; 60-64% poultry and eggs (ERS, Livestock Dairy 
and Poultry Outlook http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/livestock/ldp-mbb/2002/ldp-m102f.pdf); 
4 For hog production feed costs represented 47% of total costs in industrial farrow-to-finish operations in 
1998 (McBride and Key 2003). Other estimates put the share of feed costs for pork at 65% (Tarter 2001). 





The animals are not the only ones concentrated in factory farming.  Ownership is 
concentrated in very few corporate hands, presenting an industry dominated by a 
relatively small number of very large transnational corporations with oligopoly market 
power in the international food system.  Concentration ratios – the market share 
controlled by the top four producers, presented as a “CR4” percentage – are high across 
the board, often over 50% (see Table 1).  (Markets are considered concentrated if the 
share exceeds 20%, and very highly concentrated if it approaches or exceeds 50%.)   
 
The corporations that dominate the industrial livestock sector in the United States 
are among the chief beneficiaries of low U.S. feed prices.  Remarkably little research has 
been done on the extent of these benefits.  A broad literature review revealed not a single 
academic article in the peer-reviewed agricultural economics literature that analyzed the 
benefits to livestock operations of low feed prices.
6 
 
There is a need for such research.  Some farmer advocacy organizations have 
argued that the real beneficiaries of price-depressing U.S. agricultural policies are the 
agribusiness interests that supply inputs to the farm sector and that consume its outputs.
7  
The input suppliers include seed companies (e.g. Monsanto), chemical companies (e.g. 
Dow), and equipment manufacturers (e.g. John Deere).  Subsidy programs inject cash 
into the farm economy and encourage high levels of row-crop production in lieu of 
extensive livestock production.  This increases the demand for inputs to crop production.  
Meanwhile, to the extent input suppliers hold monopoly positions, either in the industry 
as a whole or in a local area, they can use their market power to capture an inordinate 
share of the farm dollar through pricing policies.   
 
On the other end of the value chain are the agribusiness consumers that use grain 
and other bulk commodities as inputs into their vertically integrated industries.  Cheap 
grain prices lower their operating costs.  This in turn makes their products more 
competitive globally, increasing their shares of a rapidly globalizing agri-food market.  
At the end of the chain are the supermarkets, which are currently undergoing a rapid 
wave of concentration led by, but not limited to, Wal-Mart {Hendrickson, 2005 #17; 
Vorley, 2003 #238}. 
 
The principal buyers for farmers of corn, soybeans and other feed grains are 
livestock companies or the feed companies that supply them.  These are largely pork, 
poultry, beef, and dairy operations.  How much they benefit from low prices has gone 
largely undocumented to date.  The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) 
calculates its dumping margins on the basis of farmers’ average costs of production, as 
calculated by USDA.  Those numbers are not a direct measure of the discount on feed 
prices from U.S. policies, but they give some indication of the extent to which prices are 
                                                 
6 (On livestock benefits, see, for example, Adams and Young 1998; Skaggs and Falk 1998; Ishmael 1999; 
Halverson 2000; Congressional Press Release 2001; Tarter 2001; Desquilbet and Guyomard 2002; 
Holtslander 2002; Lexington Herald-Leader 2002; Berthelot 2004). 
7 See, for example, analysis from the National Family Farm Coalition and the Institute for Agriculture and 





below costs.  As Figure 2  shows, the dumping margins for soybeans and maize (corn), 
after the 1996 Farm Bill, are 12% and 19% respectively (Murphy, Lilliston et al. 2005).
8   
 
Figure 2. 
Dumping Margins and 1996 Farm Bill
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Source: IATP, "The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture: A Decade of Dumping," 2005
 
 
Those figures suggest that agribusiness livestock operators are getting a discount 
of about 15% on their most important operating cost.  If that total expense represents 50-
65% of operating costs for poultry and hog producers, then their overall costs could be as 
much as 7-10% higher if these corporations bought feed grain at a price closer to its cost 
of production. 
 
This price differential could have great import for the structure of the farm sector.  
Diversified family farmers are hurt in several ways by cheap-grain policies.  First, they 
receive depressed prices for their bulk commodities.  Second, and less well understood, 
when they feed their own livestock with a mixture of their own grains, they are in effect 
paying full cost for that feed, while corporate buyers are getting it below cost.  Third, 
diversified operations, which use hay, pasture, and other grains for feed in addition to 
corn and soybeans, tend to be more labor intensive and more vulnerable to price 
competition.  Finally, industrial livestock operations drive down the price of livestock, 
further squeezing diversified farmers out of animal production and into bulk row crops.  
This in turn contributes to the price problem by increasing supply. 
 
Again, little rigorous academic research has been done on the subject, but CAFOs 
often operate on tight margins; their cost advantages over diversified family farmers’ 
                                                 
8 Calculations based solely on USDA figures for costs of production and returns from sales suggest slightly 
lower margins, not surprising since they exclude transportation and handling costs.  For corn, costs 
exceeded market returns nationally by 10.8% in 2004, while for soybeans the comparable margin was 8.7% 





livestock operations are not always large.  It remains to be seen whether raising the prices 
of feed grain would tip the balance back toward the family farmer, but it could.  This 
would be an important area for future research.   
 
Whether or not bringing feed costs closer to their costs of production would affect 
the structure of the farm sector –away from CAFOs and toward diversified family farms 
– it would undoubtedly represent a shift toward family farmers.  If such reforms were 
made in combination with other key livestock-related reforms being demanded by family 
farmers – e.g. Packer Ban on livestock ownership, Captive Supply controls, and 
excluding CAFOs from payments under the environmental cleanup program, EQIP – and 
farm groups won full funding and implementation of the Conservation Security Program, 
family farmers might begin to reverse their downward economic slide (NFFC 2005). 
 
 
Trade Implications: Feed Subsidies as Input Subsidies 
 
The livestock issue has an important trade aspect as well.  Within the WTO 
agriculture regime, input subsidies are considered one of the more trade-distorting forms 
of support. They are included in the Amber Box and subject to restrictions.  To the extent 
that they reduce the price of exports, they can be considered export subsidies, subject to 
immediate termination.  The United States notifies some grain subsidies – emergency 
payments, marketing loan gains, and other price- or production-based programs – to the 
WTO as production-distorting, and therefore subject to limits under the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), based on the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS).  
Decoupled payments – known as direct payments and production flexibility contracts – 
are treated as non-distorting and therefore are allowed under the agreement’s Green Box. 
 
Remarkably, subsidies to feed grains are not considered input subsidies despite 
the fact that more than half of corn and soybeans is used as an input for livestock. To the 
extent that feed subsidies reduce the costs and prices of exported meats, they could also 
be considered export subsidies and subject to more stringent limits.  It could be argued – 
and perhaps litigated – that subsidies to feed be treated as input subsidies, and that the 
portion that gets exported in meat be treated as an export subsidy.  The stakes are high for 
the EU and the United States.
9 
 
The WTO ruling in favor of Brazil in the cotton dispute addresses just this issue 
of subsidy definition.  The panel refused to accept the U.S. government’s notification of 
its subsidy programs to different boxes.  The United States was found to have exceeded 
its allowable subsidy levels in significant part because the panel ruled that several types 
of subsidies notified as minimally trade-distorting (Blue or Green box) had in fact 
                                                 
9 Jacques Berthelot of the French NGO Solidarite has written extensively on this subject.  Several of his 
papers, in French and English, can be found at: http://solidarite.asso.fr/actions/Agriculture.htm.  Much of 
this paper’s analysis draws on this work, most notably “Why the EU's blue subsidies are coupled and 





depressed prices with a prejudicial impact on the Brazilian cotton sector.  Specifically, 
the panel found that for the period 1999-2002: 
 
•  Direct payments on cotton, amounting to $617 million, are not “minimally-trade 
distorting,” so they should be reclassified as trade-distorting domestic support.  
These should join the $2.2 billion in Marketing Loan Gains and Counter-cyclical 
Payments in the Amber Box, putting the United States over its allowed limit 
(1992 levels). 
•  Export credits totaling $1.6 billion for cotton and other commodities, which the 
United States did not notify to the WTO, should have been notified and classified 
as export subsidies, which are slated for elimination. 
•  So-called Step 2 subsidies, which paid U.S. textile manufacturers $400 million to 
use U.S. cotton, were notified as Amber Box subsidies when they should have 
been considered export subsidies and slated for elimination. 
 
The implications of the ruling go well beyond cotton.  The categorization of 
developed country subsidies has been left largely to the countries themselves to decide. 
There has been much criticism of the United States and European Union for cheating on 
their reduction commitments by failing to notify the WTO of payments in a timely 
manner, by omitting some payments from such notifications, and by misclassifying 
payments.  The United States and European Union could be much more vulnerable to 
demands for reduction if the WTO insisted on greater consistency and transparency in 
their notifications.  The United States stands perilously close to allowable subsidy limits 
under the existing agreement, so much so that the U.S. government currently is seeking to 
shift the categorization of some of its subsidies from the Amber to the Green or Blue 
boxes to avoid mandated reductions. 
 
There has been no litigation to date on feed subsidies as input subsidies, although 
feed comes from the most heavily subsidized commodities.
10  The OECD, for its part, has 
been clear in its characterizations of input subsidies as trade-distorting and of feed as an 
input for livestock production: 
 
Input subsidies are typically explicit or implicit payments reducing the 
price paid by farmers for variable inputs (for example, fertilisers, feed, 
seeds, energy, water, transportation, insurance), which are provided to 
farmers through policy instruments, including interest concessions, tax 
rebates and budgetary transfers to input industries to provide lower input 
prices paid by farmers
11. 
 
Jacques Berthelot suggests that tariff-free U.S. exports of subsidized feed grain to 
the EU in the 1960s led to the growth of industrial livestock production there and 
                                                 
10 About 60% of EU cereals are fed to animals, and corn and soybeans account for 83-91% of the 
ingredients in most processed feeds. USDA, Feed Grains Data Delivery System, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/db/feedgrains/default.asp?ERSTab=0 





subsequent policies by the EU to drive down domestic feed grain prices to competitive 
levels.  In the 1990s, the EU cut support prices for cereals by 45%, leading to a steep 
drop in feed costs and a sharp rise in poultry production and exports. This has made 
direct export subsidies less necessary (Berthelot 2004).   
 
These policies lead quite directly to dumping.  From 1995-2001, EU poultry 
exports to ACP countries rose from 81,000 tonnes to 215,000 tonnes.  According to one 
report, EU poultry exports to Cameroon increased over 2000% from 1996-2003.  
Cameroon’s local poultry production dropped 37% and 110,000 jobs in the sector were 
lost in 2003 alone (Farmers' World Network 2003; Nforgang and De Mol 2004). 
 
 
Counting Feed Subsidies as Input Subsidies 
 
This is not an arcane accounting exercise.  Berthelot (2004) has calculated that if 
feed grains were counted as input subsidies, the European Union would have under-
notified its Amber Box payments from 1995-6 to 2000-1 by 54 billion Euros, or an 
average of 9 billion Euros per year.  For 2003 the additional amount would be 11 billion 
Euros, which would count against the EU’s limit under the negotiated Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) of 67 billion Euros.
12  The EU still has some room for 
manoeuvre under the AMS limit, but much less if feed grain subsidies were counted. 
 
For the United States, counting feed grain subsidies as input subsidies could put 
the United States over its AMS limit of $19.1 billion.  For 1999 and 2000, the United 
States notified an AMS of $16.8 billion to the WTO.  Reclassifying the percentage of 
subsidies for feed grains—barley, corn, oats, sorghum, and wheat—and soybeans that are 
used as feed as Amber Box subsidies would shift the contents of the box significantly.  
The feed portion of subsidies not currently included in the Amber Box, such as 
production flexibility contracts (PFCs), and of subsidies no longer eligible for 
classification as non-product-specific (NPS) support, such as market loss assistance, 
would move into the product-specific AMS for livestock.  According to our initial 
calculations, this addition would add $2.1 billion in 1999 and $5.5 billion in 2000 to the 
total AMS. For 1999, $1.8 billion of the additional amount would come from PFCs, and 
$336 million from reclassified NPS subsidies. For 2000, $1.8 billion would come from 
PFCs, and $3.7 billion from reclassified NPS subsidies.  That would put the U.S. AMS at 
$19.04 billion in 1999, just under the $19.1 billion limit, and $22.3 billion for 2000, $3.2 
billion over the limit.  
 
For 2001, the U.S. AMS would increase $3.8 billion – $1.4 billion from PFCs, 
$2.3 billion from NPS subsidy reclassification – but because the notification was only 
                                                 
12 This AMS figure is from 2001/2002, the last year notified to the WTO.  WTO, Committee on 





$14.6 billion that year, the AMS would rise to $18.4 billion, approaching but staying 
below the AMS ceiling.
13  
 
Some researchers argue that other subsidies besides feed are under-notified to the 
WTO and that their full inclusion in the notification would increase the United States’ 
AMS level even further.  Jacques Berthelot, for example, argues that production 
flexibility contracts (or, after 2002, direct payments) and insurance subsidies should be 
fully included in U.S. calculations for product-specific support, and that subsidies for 
farm loans, irrigation, and agricultural fuel should be fully included in the non-product-
specific notification.  Adding these amounts to the current notification would raise the 





Debates over U.S. agricultural policies have tended to focus heavily on subsidy 
payments to farmers.  It may be that the most important issue isn’t subsidies, and the 
most important beneficiaries of U.S. policies are not farmers.  Industrial livestock 
operations are among the most important beneficiaries of agricultural policies that 
depress the prices for feed.  With feed costs as the most important operating cost in 
industrial livestock operations, the benefits are significant.   
 
This paper poses two research questions that require further attention.  First is the 
need to assess the extent to which U.S. feed is being provided to industrial livestock 
operations at prices below farmers’ costs of production.  To the extent prices are below 
costs, there is the related need to assess what the structural impacts on the sector would 
be if prices more accurately reflected costs.  The initial research presented here suggests 
that the impacts of higher prices could be significant, making diversified family farms 
more competitive relative to industrial livestock operations. 
 
Second, we assess the trade implications of treating subsidies to feed as input 
subsidies, which are more strongly disciplined under the current Agreement on 
Agriculture.  An initial set of calculations suggests that this change could put the United 
States over its allowed subsidy limits under the agreement.  A more detailed analysis 
would be needed to assess whether current WTO disciplines would indeed justify 
                                                 
13 Author’s calculations based on available data. Using PFC payments (Economic Research Service 1996) 
and percentages of grain and soy used for feed (OECD 2004; Baker 2005; Vocke 2005), we calculated the 
additional product-specific support that would be added for subsidized feed inputs to livestock products.  
Our calculations estimated that an additional $1.8 billion in 1999 and 2000 and $1.4 billion in 2001 would 
be added to the product-specific AMS.  Using the subsidies for grains and soybeans currently included in 
non-product-specific (NPS) support (USDA/FSA 2001; USDA/FSA 2004)and the percentages of these 
products used for feed, we calculated the amount that would move from NPS to product-specific categories 
for livestock products once feed was reclassified as a subsidized input.  We determined that an additional 
$336 million in 1999, $3.7 billion in 2000, and $2.3 billion in 2001 would be added to product-specific 
support for livestock products. These additions bring the total AMS up from $16.8 billion to $19.04 billion 
in 1999; from $16.8 billion to $22.3 billion in 2000; and from $14.6 billion to $18.4 billion in 2001 (WTO 





separate treatment for feed subsidies and to confirm the implications of such a change in 
the categorization of U.S. subsidies. 
 
Agribusiness interests are largely left out of the debates over U.S. agricultural and 
trade policies.  Payments mainly go to farmers, and the WTO negotiations focus 
principally on disciplining such payments and reducing other forms of agricultural 
support and protection.  Yet the transnational corporations that dominate the agri-food 
sector are among the most important beneficiaries of policies that lead to low commodity 
prices by encouraging overproduction.   
 
It is important to identify the real winners from U.S. agricultural policies.  A 
closer examination of the benefits to industrial livestock operations would be a good 
place to start.  
 
 
Timothy A. Wise is Deputy Director of the Global Development and Environment 
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